neverfox wrote:If I may interject, if only to practice translating geo-speak:
Richard_A_Garner wrote:Compensation is only owed if one person violated the rights of another.
But recall that JW's Georgist position starts with a presumption that there is a collective ownership in the land. That sets up a right (in his view) that can be then violated because the "rogue" appropriator has not received the permission of all his co-owners to put up a boundary around his claim. But these co-owners can prefer that their joint right be interpreted as being a "standing order" to the effect of: you don't need to actually bother getting our permission as long as you recognize the market's ability to signal economic rent as a measure of the degree to which you are interfering with our joint ownership. Is that about right, JW?
But it seems to me - correct me if I am wrong - that he is saying for example that my taking for myself an apple owned in common is something I have a right to do, since I have an "individual access right" to things in the commons, but that taking that apple for myself would
also be a violation of rights, since it would deprive others of that apple, and perhaps force them to put up with inferior apples. This, in other words, implies that exercising my right is a violation rights, or that I cannot exercise my rights without also violating rights. It means that I have a right to violate rights.
I find the notion incoherent, or at least a failure to accomplish what we presumably want rights to do, which is to break deadlocks by enabling us to rule in a party's favour in a dispute. Disputes arise because of incompossibilities of actions, but this theory of rights seems to have incompossibility written in.
Of course, it is no reason to reject varients of "geoism," because, for instance, Steiner's approach acknowledges the problem of incompossibility and rejects that the world is originally owned in common by everybody, but rather that it is all entirely privately owned, but every person should have an equal amount of land. new generations, deprived of an equal amount of land, are entitled to compensation for this fact.
Your interpretation of the lockean proviso would make any just appropriation impossible.
Actually, I don't think JW would deny that all appropriation is unjust (as noted above) to the degree that it generates economic rent but that it can be rectified with compensation in place of getting permission from everyone on the planet.
Why the economic rent? Why not, a la Nozick, simply say that if the appropriation doesn't worsen the position of others, then it is just?
Because that begs the question against the Georgist?
Perhaps, but it surely seems possible that if those deprived of the ability to excercise their "individual equal access rights" by an appropriation are no worse off than had the appropriation not occurred, it is difficult to see why they are entitled to compensation. And if they are better off, then we could imagine that compensation has been delivered in that means.
Personally, I, who own no house and no land, consider my position in even this imperfect and statist society, better than had I been a hunter gatherer exercising "individual equal access rights," which would suggest that I am compensated for the fact that I can't exercise these rights.