Forums of the Libertarian Left

[AlaskanAnarchist]

I've started a list of anarchist audiobooks that I think could be useful to other ALLies. I end up driving a lot for work, or spending a good deal of time at the gym, so I end up going through audio books a lot faster than their ink and paper counterparts. I'm sure many of you are the same way. If you have any recommendations for additions, PLEASE POST THEM! I'm running low on new material!

Many books available from:
http://www.audioanarchy.org/

Anarchism and Other Essays by Emma Goldman
http://librivox.org/anarchism-and-other-essays-by-emma-goldman/

God and the State by Mikhail Bakunin
http://librivox.org/god-and-the-state-by-mikhail-bakunin/

The Ego and His Own by Max Stirner (Unfinished...)
http://librivox.org/forum/viewtopic.php?p=203398

Vices Are Not Crimes by Lysander Spooner
http://librivox.org/vices-are-not-crimes-by-lysander-spooner/

Essay on Trial by Jury by Lysander Spooner
http://librivox.org/essay-on-the-trial-by-jury-by-lysander-spooner/

The Conquest of Bread by Peter Kropotkin
http://librivox.org/the-conquest-of-bread-by-peter-kropotkin/

Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution by Peter Kropotkin
http://librivox.org/mutual-aid-a-factor-of-evolution-by-peter-kropotkin/

On the Duty of Civil Disobedience by Henry David Thoreau
http://librivox.org/on-the-duty-of-civil-disobedience-by-henry-david-thoreau/

Mises Audio Books:
http://mises.org/media.aspx?action=category&ID=85
http://mises.org/media.aspx?action=category&ID=159

Anarchism Withough Hyphens by Karl Hess
http://www.nostate.com/3201/anarchism-without-hyphens-by-karl-hess-podcast/

Scratching By: How Government Creates Poverty As We Know It by Charles Johnson
http://www.nostate.com/2373/scratching-by-how-government-creates-poverty-as-we-know-it-podcast/

Tax is Theft by Samuel Edward Konkin III
http://www.nostate.com/2300/tax-is-theft-mp3-podcast/

Confiscation and the Homestead Principle by Murry N. Rothbard
http://www.nostate.com/2271/confiscation-and-the-homestead-principle-mp3-podcast/

The Iron Fist Behind the Invisible Hand by Kevin Carson
http://www.nostate.com/2228/the-iron-fist-beind-the-invisible-hand-audio-mp3-podcast/

Agorist Class Theory by Samuel Edward Konkin III
http://www.nostate.com/2164/agorist-class-theory-audio-mp3-podcast/

New Libertarian Manifesto by SEK3
http://www.nostate.com/2111/new-libertarian-manifesto-audio-mp3-podcast/

No Treason by Lysander Spooner
http://marcstevens.net/media/audio/32-no-treason-the-constitution-of-no-authority.html

The Market For Liberty
http://freekeene.com/free-audiobook/

Once again, if you have suggestions for the list , please post them below, they are much appreciated!

[Vichy]

Bakunin is not an 'anarchist', he wanted to have a secret conspiracy that ruled an internationalist socialist world order; it's like he was actually advocating what the Nazis like to imagine the jews were doing.

[Brainpolice]

*eyeroll*

[Vichy]

I'd also point out that Stirner is not an anarchist (he specifically mocks them in his book). But, aside from that, I was considering doing an audio version of LA Rollins' The Myth of Natural Rights.

[AlaskanAnarchist]

I was considering doing an audio version of LA Rollins' The Myth of Natural Rights.

Please let me know if you do. I haven't managed to get ahold of a copy of the book yet, but I've heard good things about it.

[neverfox]

Please let me know if you do. I haven't managed to get ahold of a copy of the book yet, but I've heard good things about it.

It's pretty lame. He doesn't even know the difference between descriptive and normative statements and is pretty confused about epistemology. I have a copy in PDF (thanks, Vichy). Shoot me a PM.

[Vichy]

Please let me know if you do. I haven't managed to get ahold of a copy of the book yet, but I've heard good things about it.

It's pretty lame. He doesn't even know the difference between descriptive and normative statements and is pretty confused about epistemology. I have a copy in PDF (thanks, Vichy). Shoot me a PM.

Sure he does. Normative statements are fallacious.

[neverfox]

Sure he does. Normative statements are fallacious.

That's a different matter from actually telling the difference between what normative implies and description implies:

Another natural rights mythologizer is Eric Mack who says, "Lockean rights alone provide the moral philosophical barrier against the State's encroachment upon Society." But a "moral philosophical barrier" is merely a metaphorical barrier, and it will no more prevent the State's encroachment upon "Society" than a moral philosophical shield will stop a physical arrow from piercing your body.

He wants to prove normativity is fallacious by showing us how they don't "act" in the descriptive sense. Like I said, he can't (or won't) tell the difference.

Murder may be impractical or excessively risky or just not worth the trouble. There are all sorts of reasons why I might refrain from committing murder, even when I would like to do it. But murder is not "wrong." Murder is not "immoral." And the same goes for rape, robbery, assault, battery, burglary, buggery, bestiality, incest, treason, torturing children, suicide, cannibalism, cannabisism, etc.

Bonus points for commitment but a few words for Rollins: extraordinary claims take on the burden of proof and these are extraordinary. He chastises the mythology of morality while making claims that are less plausible to almost everyone (mostly people not L.A. Rollins or Vichy) - that nothing is "wrong" - than other claims (that at least something might be worth reverence or the label "good") that are more plausible. I'm reminded of YECs, flat earthers or idealists.

George H. Smith has written about something he calls "rational morality," as distinguished from "religious morality." But Smith's "rational morality" is based on positing happiness as "man's ultimate value." ...Smith's "rational morality," to use Harry Browne's terminology, is neither an absolute nor a universal morality. It is merely a personal morality. It is binding or obligatory only on those who, like Smith presumably, pursue happiness as their ultimate value. Of course, many people pursue other values as their ultimate value, for example, survival or autonomy or family or duty.

Praxeology fail?

etc. etc.

[ctmummey]

There are all sorts of reasons why I might refrain from committing murder, even when I would like to do it. But murder is not "wrong." Murder is not "immoral."

lolling @ this

[AlaskanAnarchist]

There are all sorts of reasons why I might refrain from committing murder, even when I would like to do it. But murder is not "wrong." Murder is not "immoral."

lolling @ this

I'm not entirely sure why. If you accept the viewpoint that there is no such thing as objective morality, a view that I think has at least some merit, words like "wrong" and "immoral" are meaningless. From that viewpoint, the sentence makes perfect sense to me.

[Brainpolice]

There are all sorts of reasons why I might refrain from committing murder, even when I would like to do it. But murder is not "wrong." Murder is not "immoral."

lolling @ this

I'm not entirely sure why. If you accept the viewpoint that there is no such thing as objective morality, a view that I think has at least some merit, words like "wrong" and "immoral" are meaningless. From that viewpoint, the sentence makes perfect sense to me.

The problem, from my pov, is that many moral nihilists present us with a false dualistic choice between moral nihilism and a naive caracature of moral objectivism (that is, characterizing moral objectivists as more naive in their belief that they actually are). One of the classic stupidities in such discussions is when the moral nihilist pulls out the card that "rights" aren't a literal physical shield that will protect you, as if anyone claims that in the first place (when it obviously is the societal respect for the norm that "protects" you; the practial nature of a "right" has to do with the consequences of it being upheld; the point is that the adoption of the norm itself in terms of the psychology of interpersonal relations is what functions as a restraint, not that it's some literal metaphysical or physical barrier in and of itself, and the lack of such a barrier does nothing to counteract this practical element of "rights"). It relies on characterizing moral beliefs as more abstract and metaphysical than they necessarily are.

[neverfox]

I'm not entirely sure why. If you accept the viewpoint that there is no such thing as objective morality, a view that I think has at least some merit, words like "wrong" and "immoral" are meaningless. From that viewpoint, the sentence makes perfect sense to me.

But I'm not judging him on his logical consistency. It's perfect valid. What I'm saying is that it isn't unreasonable to judge his argument by examining the believability of the conclusions it generates; such extraordinary claims place a burden of proof on Rollins. The ordinary response to "Murder is wrong" is "Of course", not "That's your opinion". These ordinary beliefs and practices could be mistaken, of course, but the view that objective values exist "has at least some merit" too (I could lay some reasons out but I won't get on a digression here) and when two theories are both plausible but one leaves most people lol at your internally elegant theory, you may be right when all is said and done - we could all be deluded and simply unable to understand the genius of Rollins - but they aren't being unreasonable to continue endorsing the more psychologically realistic one in the meantime (I wonder how many people Rollins has spoken to who have actually had to take another life and live with it).

[James]

Bonus points for commitment but a few words for Rollins: extraordinary claims take on the burden of proof and these are extraordinary. He chastises the mythology of morality while making claims that are less plausible to almost everyone (mostly people not L.A. Rollins or Vichy) - that nothing is "wrong" - than other claims (that at least something might be worth reverence or the label "good") that are more plausible. I'm reminded of YECs, flat earthers or idealists.

This is even more true when nihilists try to use scepticism as a defence ie. "how can we know for certain whether rights exist or not?".

[neverfox]

This is even more true when nihilists try to use scepticism as a defence ie. "how can we know for certain whether rights exist or not?".

Not to mention that kittehs are undeniably good.

[Vichy]

The tendency for people to believe, or disbelieve, any given assertion has no relation whatsoever to its logical coherence or its factuality. The fact that people believe things are 'immoral' does not make their assertions meaningful, anymore than the assertion that 'god' exists and many billions claim to believe in 'god' put the burden of proof upon the atheist. The person who claims that a normative exists independent of the actual subjective motivation and perceived means of a given actor is making a claim that is logically incoherent, it is sheer supernaturalism.

Contra Long, 'Happiness' is not the 'highest value'; nor does Smith claim so. Rollins' says just thereafter that Smith disavows pretensions of universality of such a 'summum bonnum', and thus his views can not be considered 'morality' in the imperative or normative sense.

Satisfaction in the sense of that which actually motivates action is the only sort of 'highest good' or 'end' there is, and it is not any particular desire or feeling or aim in itself but merely a logical description of the relationship of motivation to action.

[neverfox]

The tendency for people to believe, or disbelieve, any given assertion has no relation whatsoever to its logical coherence or its factuality.

'Duh' as they say. But nonetheless, if it seems the case that A (ceteris paribus and A in this case being "People overwhelmingly respond to murder as if it actually is wrong and not choiceworthy"), that shifts the burden of proof to deniers of the truth of it. You may have a winning argument but until you show good reason for believing it is other than as it seems to those to whom it seems that way, the "as it seems" crowd really isn't dropping the ball. And yes that includes concepts like god and geocentric theories of the universe (back when such theories seemed very true because of their usefulness in predicting and navigation). BoP isn't about which side has the better argument because that is putting the cart before the horse.

And I think it's pretty undeniable that it seems to be the case that when we desire something or regard it as good or valuable, that we are responding to apparent value. While that might be completely wrong, it's not incoherent much less logically so. This is no stranger a starting place than the view that when we desire something or regard it as good or valuable, we are simply acting on blind impulses.

The fact that people believe things are 'immoral' does not make their assertions meaningful, anymore than the assertion that 'god' exists and many billions claim to believe in 'god' put the burden of proof upon the atheist.

I do think ceteris paribus the burden of proof is on the atheist in a world where it seems like people act and respond as if a god really is there (which is something more than people simply asserting it; it needs to be reflected in action..see Wittgenstein). It's more psychologically realistic to say that when we choose we choose as a response to apparent value, thus we are committed to objective value until shown good reason not to. That is intimately tied into human action. It's on the level of seeming to see what's in front of our face. It is an extraordinary claim to say that when people choose, they aren't really responding to anything in making the choice, i.e. that it's non-cognitive. You actually seem to say as much:

The person who claims that a normative exists independent of the actual subjective motivation and perceived means of a given actor is making a claim that is logically incoherent, it is sheer supernaturalism.

That's more like it! Now you are giving reasons. To address them though, I would say that no such claim needs to be made in a theory of objective value. Being objective wouldn't mean that it would have to not be agent-relative. One only needs a concept of constitutive means and an ultimate end that is tied to the very fundamental explanation of what an organism is, i.e. the ability to even deploy the concept of the subject of ethics, the life-form.

Also, 'subjective motivation' is probably question begging.

[ctmummey]

The person who claims that a normative exists independent of the actual subjective motivation and perceived means of a given actor is making a claim that is logically incoherent, it is sheer supernaturalism.

if you accept natural law & the capacity for reason it is certainly not supernaturalism (you'd have to explain how it is logical incoherent - i missed your proof) although i agree there is a sense in which oughts are sifted out of our collective experiences ie they are not independent of experiences because we don't think in a vacuum.

to say that there are no oughts feels like the mirror image of supernaturalism. you are saying something that we agree we all use day in and day out doesn't actually exist!

[Vichy]

What people 'use' is signalling and emotional behaviour with a background in learned social perceptions; people can not make assertions about extrapersonal normatives, or god, because such things are gibberish.

Reason is personal, though universal, it is not affected in any way by the number of people who do or do not believe anything or how they behave. The facts are the facts, regardless of anyone's perception of them. If the entire world talks nonsense, the entire world is wrong; and although no one is required to agree unless they have conceived of the relationship one is not logically required to prove that contradictions are false.

For that matter, what most people say about any intellectual subject (and here I think you would have to agree) is either horribly distorted, absurdly simplified or obviously false. To quote Henrik Ibsen's An Enemy of the People, "The majority is always wrong."

[hayenmill]

From Audio Anarchy:

Letters of Insurgents http://www.audioanarchy.org/letters.html

Thoughts on Society of the Spectacle http://www.audioanarchy.org/spectacle.html

Against the Logic of Submission http://www.audioanarchy.org/submission.html

The Anarchist Tension http://www.audioanarchy.org/tension.html

Anti-Work Essays http://www.audioanarchy.org/antiwork.html

Days of War Nights of Love http://www.audioanarchy.org/downol.html

Emma Goldman Essays http://www.audioanarchy.org/emma.html

Anarchist Critique of Democracy http://www.audioanarchy.org/radio/democracy/index.html

An Introduction to Property http://www.audioanarchy.org/radio/property/index.html

An Introduction to a Critique of Technology http://www.audioanarchy.org/radio/technology/index.html

A Hitchhiker's Audio Tour of the U.S.A http://www.audioanarchy.org/radio/tour/index.html

I just found this website recently, and only managed to listen to "An Introduction to Property" so far, but it looks legit traditional anarchist information.

[AlaskanAnarchist]

Got around to reading "The Myth of Natural Rights" tonight, and I can say that there was only one paragraph in the book (if 15 pages can be considered a book..) that I take issue with. That is:

If people, by their very biological nature, are unequal, then egalitarianism is, as Rothbard has
said, a revolt against nature. But libertarianism, the advocacy of "a free society" in which people
enjoy "equal freedom" and "equal rights," is actually just a specific form of egalitarianism. As
such, libertarianism itself is a revolt against nature. If people, by their very biological nature, are
unequal in all the attributes necessary to achieving and preserving "freedom" and "rights," e.g.,
strength, courage, aggressiveness, persistence, determination, intelligence, etc., then there is no
way that people can enjoy "equal freedom" or "equal rights." If "a free society" is conceived as a
society of "equal freedom," then there ain't no such thing as "a free society." TANSTAAFS.

Unfortunately, it's late and I have neither the time nor the energy to write a critique at the moment.

[neverfox]

Got around to reading "The Myth of Natural Rights" tonight, and I can say that there was only one paragraph in the book (if 15 pages can be considered a book..) that I take issue with.

It's hard not to arrive at the conclusion he does though if you accept the rest of it. In other words, on a quick glance, his argument appears valid if not sound. Rollins thinks that rights are obtained by "attributes necessary to achieving and preserving" them; those attributes aren't equally distributed; therefore, rights and freedom aren't equally distributed. But again, I think he makes the mistake of confusing description and normativity yet again. It's like when he made the comment about how rights can't "stop a physical arrow from piercing your body"; that's just another way of saying some people don't have the "strength, courage, aggressiveness, persistence, determination, intelligence" to stop it from killing them. He's is mixing up the idea of "rights", i.e. "claims that actually receive respect", and normative rights. i.e. "claims that ought to receive respect". "Rights" that natural rights theorists discuss are the normative kind and "strength, courage, aggressiveness, persistence, determination, intelligence" unless those things were part of what ought to matter - assuming you can make the case for "oughts" to begin with, which is where the real debate should...oops, I did it again...be.